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case of the Sunbeam 
Corporation 
Agostini Marisa and Giovanni Favero 
Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, Italy 
Abstract 
This article closely examines the Sunbeam Corporation’s path to failure and explores the reasons for its 
singularity. From the analysis of US fraud cases included in the UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database, 
this corporate case appears as an outlier. For Sunbeam, the time-lapse between fraud disclosure and its 
final bankruptcy is the longest of the entire sample; it is unique because of its length. This article uses a 
historical microanalysis to evaluate different hypotheses about the Sunbeam Corporation’s path to failure. 
The relationships between acquisitions and fraud, ‘scapegoat dynamics’ and ‘creative auditing’ are identified 
as the most relevant issues to be examined against a changing institutional context. The resulting 
reconstruction of the events provides unexpected insights and recommendations for future research on 
auditing and accounting fraud. 
Keywords 
accounting fraud, creative auditing, failure path, historical microanalysis 
Introduction 
Accounting research, in dealing with the relationship between corporate fraud and failure, has 
gradually shifted its focus from predicting final bankruptcy (Altman, 1968; Beaver, 1968) to 
understanding failure as a process (Cybinski, 2001; Humphrey, 2008). Empirical studies have 
identified several determinants of fraud (Erickson et al., 2006), have investigated its duration 
(Baer, 2008; Erickson et al., 2011) and have estimated the probability of its disclosure according 
to different variables (Wang, 2013). However, there are still few studies about the complex 
interactions or relations between fraud and failure paths in changing institutional and historical 
contexts. Such relations elude aggregate statistical analysis. 
The need for detailed qualitative contextual research on famous corporate scandals is 
highlighted by authoritative literature (Humphrey, 2005; Lee, 2004; Parker, 2005). This literature 
explicitly suggests bringing ‘large scale corporate crash experiences under the microscope’ 
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(Parker, 2012: 67). Some scholars, however, have expressed doubts concerning idiosyncrasies in 
the significance of ethnographic case studies (Armstrong, 2008) and the arbitrary selection of 
historical facts (Kieser, 1994: 617–619). In order to avoid this, in this work, the authors 
purposely choose a case that questions the regularities identified by statistical analysis. They 
focus on the reasons for such a singularity and use the results to explore the limited scope of 
existing theories with a view to generating new hypotheses. 
In a previous study, Agostini (2013) demonstrates that fraud disclosure usually leads firms to 
bankruptcy very quickly. The author performs a statistical analysis of the time between the date 
of fraud disclosure and that of bankruptcy in all the fraud cases listed by the UCLA-LoPucki 
Bankruptcy Research Database, including bankruptcies of US-listed companies from 1 October 
1979 to 1 March 2010. The estimated survival function assigns a 75 per cent chance of falling 
into bankruptcy within 215 days after the date of fraud disclosure. The maximum length from 
fraud disclosure to bankruptcy is 840 days: this was the case with the Sunbeam Corporation, 
which emerges as the farthest outlier in the sample (Figure 1). 
Taking as a starting point a dataset on bankruptcy, this article considers a case of finite time 
between fraud disclosure and final bankruptcy. The period of time (between fraud disclosure and 
final bankruptcy) can actually be finite or infinite (when the entity recovers without going 
bankrupt after fraud disclosure). Yet the possibility of a fraud without bankruptcy does not 
disprove the singularity of the inordinately long path to failure of the Sunbeam Corporation 
(considered here). This is the most evident exception to the statistical regularity of rapid failure 
after fraud disclosure (as identified in Figure 1): it represents a hybrid anomaly between finite 
(and usually short) and infinite time to failure. 
The efficacy of considering ‘deviant cases’ has been emphasized in methodological debate 
within the social sciences from different perspectives (Emigh, 1997). More recently, Ermakoff 
(2014) has distinguished the different theoretical contributions of studying anomalies that 
challenge categories, exceptions that identify new objects of enquiry and outliers that make new 
connections visible. Interpreting these distinctions using the framework of a micro-historical 
approach (Fellman and Rahikainen, 2012; Magnússon and Szíjártó, 2013; Williams, 1999), the 
authors use the latter in this article to highlight the absence of expected elements and the 
presence or the visibility of aspects not considered in the literature. This makes it possible to 
question the general validity of explanatory models, to eventually identify the case as 
paradigmatic of a specific institutional and historical context and to explore the new heuristic 
perspectives it reveals. 
Following this approach, all the available sources of information on Sunbeam Corporation are 
utilized, such as previous accounting studies, US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
enquiry reports, business columns, revised and unrevised financial statements, published 
interviews and previous studies, in particular the rich documentation collected in Byrne (1999b).1 
These information sources are examined to identify the specific features of the case that are 
pertinent to the theoretical debate on accounting fraud and failure. This multiplication of 
perspectives is deliberately aimed at avoiding simplification. The aim is ‘not to sacrifice 
knowledge of individual elements to wider generalization’ (Levi, 1992: 109). Only in this way 
can an ‘exceptional’ case shed light on broader trends. Furthermore, it can refute general 
assumptions and lay the foundation for new theoretical interpretations. 
The authors have consequently built this analysis around the following research question: 
What are the special features of the Sunbeam case that explain its exceptionally long path to 
bankruptcy? A historical reconstruction of the events offers a pluralistic narrative, combining  
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Figure 1. Statistical analysis of the time between the fraud disclosure date and the date of bankruptcy in 
the US fraud cases of the UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database. The number label ‘27’ identifies the 
sample case of the Sunbeam Corporation; the survival function reveals that this company took 840	days 
(the maximum number of days of the sample) to fall into bankruptcy after the fraud disclosure. 
 
different theoretical approaches, and permits us to identify the crucial explanatory elements of 
the case as follows: the strategy devised to commit and conceal the fraud, the attribution of 
responsibility after disclosure and the regulatory institutional context. In line with these 
considerations, section ‘Review of the theoretical literature’ reviews the literature on different 
fraud strategies, focusing on the role of auditors as ‘scapegoats’ and extending to auditing the 
concept of ‘creative accounting’. After the case analysis, presented in section ‘A microanalysis of 
the deviant case: comparing different narratives of the events’, section ‘Discussion: putting the 
case to work’ illustrates the relationship among the variables in order to answer the research 
question and highlight the contribution of this article to the corpus of relevant accounting 
literature. Some concluding remarks summarize the main findings and implications. 
Review of the theoretical literature 
The starting point of this article is the exceptionally long timeframe from fraud disclosure to 
bankruptcy in the case of Sunbeam Corporation. The micro-analytical approach, adopted here, 
provides an opportunity to reference a wide set of literature covering different aspects of the 
theoretical debate. This allows an overall understanding of the complex evolutionary path, tracing 
the timeline from the commission of fraud, to its disclosure, and then to the company’s bankruptcy. 
In this respect, this work deals with a specific kind of fraud related to financial misstatement. 
This typology represents a minority of the total frauds occurring at global level. However, it 
makes up the absolute majority of reported losses, and it also takes the longest to be discovered 
(Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE), 2010: 10–14). Second, the article focuses 
purely on American fraud. In the United States (as in most Anglo-Saxon countries), accounting 
fraud seems mainly to be the result of pressure to perform that financial investors, market 
analysts and internal budgeting professionals exert over top and middle managers. Thus, the 
4 Accounting History 
 
notion of private benefit is only an indirect result of managerial conduct that aims, above all, to 
meet expected targets. Moreover, the role of executives’ personal behaviour, as expressed in 
overconfidence in their choices, and the imperative of ‘correcting’ poor performance that could 
threaten their jobs (Schrand and Zechman, 2011) are particularly relevant in American cases. 
Almost by definition, fraud is usually kept hidden by companies. Baer (2008) analyses the 
factors that lead manipulators to amend their conduct (if the fraud was not yet discovered). Shifting 
the blame to other people may represent one of the few conditions that lead the person committing 
the fraud to stop. Particularly interesting is the argument highlighting the presence of a ‘linkage’ 
problem. The accounts’ manipulator anticipates a higher probability of being discovered if the fraud 
ceases. This pushes managers to resort to lobbying (Yu and Yu, 2011) or to mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A; Erickson et al., 2011) as a means to postpone or avoid fraud disclosure. 
On the other hand, fraud disclosure triggers a scapegoating mechanism. It is interesting to 
analyse ‘scapegoating’ practices with reference to the anthropological literature, as have Guénin-
Paracini and Gendron (2010). René Girard (1972, 2005) has argued that scapegoating arises as an 
escape route from the war of all against all that is typical of social crises. The scapegoat is 
identified as the only culprit for the turmoil through a process of mythification that makes 
possible a shift to a war of all against one. In their fear and anger, those involved want to identify 
the cause of the crisis. According to this perspective, over the last few decades the auditing 
function is being considered more and more often as holding responsibility for corporate 
scandals. Considering the case of Arthur Andersen in the aftermath of the Enron scandal, 
Guénin-Paracini and Gendron (2010) claim that auditors ‘are often (but not always) selected as 
sacrificial victims in the wake of major corporate scandals’ (p. 134). 
Putting this observation into historical perspective, it can be seen that auditors were 
increasingly scapegoated in the early 2000s in connection with the increasing emergence of 
corporate scandals originating in the 1990s. In that period, a number of auditors were ‘fined or 
settled out of court’ (Jones, 2011). This seems to be perfectly consistent with the general 
evolution of fraud cases and legislative measures over the last decades, which focus more and 
more on auditing failure. However, the Sunbeam case demonstrates that in the immediate pre-
Enron context, the events leading to corporate failure could also take a different direction when 
the auditors’ behaviour and work make it possible to find another scapegoat. 
Building upon the work of Guénin-Paracini and Gendron (2010), this article shows that the 
scapegoating mechanism can focus on different targets depending on the context. From that 
starting point, the authors provide here an explanation for a different fraud process, in which 
auditors are neither watchdogs, nor victims, nor legally guilty entities, and introduce the concept 
of ‘creative auditing’. This represents one of the main foci of this work: it is the first 
comprehensive attempt, as far as the authors are aware, to identify another possible modality of 
auditing. This will be explained in detail, starting with the concept of ‘creative accounting’. 
Following the occurrence of famous accounting scandals which had a broad influence on the 
world economy, the concept of ‘creative accounting’ evolved through a set of legal opinions 
based on the flexibility of accounting policies. Several instances of this can be noted. 
Omurgonulsen and Omurgonulsen (2009) summarize them: creative accounting represents a 
process in which managers use their knowledge of accounting rules to manipulate reports. It also 
represents a set of undesirable practices that prevent people from seeing the true financial state of 
a company. Managers use creative accounting practices to manipulate profits to tie in with 
forecasts and to distract attention from news that would be harmful. Thus, creative accounting 
can be framed by and related to ‘agency theory’ (Amat et al., 1998). The first and most relevant 
feature of creative accounting is represented by its legitimacy: it is totally (formally) legal 
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(Griffiths, 1986). Thus, an important differentiation (Jones, 2011) must be made between a fair 
presentation (i.e. non-tort practice), in which accounting flexibility is used to give a true picture 
of accounts so that they serve stakeholder interests, and creative accounting. In creative 
accounting, the same flexibility is used to manage the measurement and presentation of the 
accounts so that they serve mainly the interests of those who prepare them. Fraudulent reporting 
consists of deliberately stepping outside the regulatory framework to give a false picture of the 
accounts. It has been defined as ‘an intentional misstatement of financial statements’ (Arens et 
al., 2003). The three practices (i.e. non-tort, creative accounting and fraud) represent the different 
possible levels of use and misuse of accounting by managers. 
The same distinction between practices has not yet been introduced in the literature for the 
auditing process. In the literature on fraud detection, the accounting and auditing functions have, 
indeed, followed different paths. However, even though they are separated from a temporal point 
of view, they are based on similar areas of research, such as those regarding the tools to improve 
fraud detection and the causes of failing processes. Thus, accounting practices (non-tort, creative 
accounting and fraud) implemented by managers may find a correspondence in the practices used 
by auditors, with the same escalation from productive to destructive methods. ‘Creative auditing’ 
may be framed by and related to agency theory in the same way as creative accounting. Auditors 
(agents) may use their professional knowledge, asymmetrical information and the flexibility of 
auditing rules to distract the attention of the principals (owners, shareholders and investors) from 
news that would be harmful, if not catastrophic. In fact, according to agency theory, information 
asymmetry occurs when agents enjoy a competitive advantage over principals because of the 
information they have about the company. Information within an organization is critical, and 
auditors working with the management of a company are aware of essential information that can 
be used in a legal but possibly unethical way to maximize their own interests at the expense of 
the principals. This results in the principals’ inability to control what they might reasonably 
expect to be the actions of the agent (Strausz, 1997). Such a situation is worsened by the 
shareholders’ limited roles in public companies (Brown, 2007). As a result, the possibility arises 
of collusion between auditors and managers (Olsen and Torsvik, 1998; Tirole, 1986). Major 
streams of literature recognize that the main causes of audit failures lie in the audit expectation 
gap (Porter, 1993; Salehi, 2011) and in the lack of auditors’ independence. Recent regulations 
(such as the Sarbanes–Oxley Act in the United States) have tried to reduce both of these. 
Based on these premises, in the following paragraphs, the authors develop the concept of 
creative auditing as a tool to interpret and understand the particular role of auditors (in 
relationship to both managers and shareholders) in the case of Sunbeam Corporation. 
A microanalysis of the deviant case: comparing different narratives of 
the events 
The Sunbeam Corporation case clearly represents an example of accounting fraud. It had been 
producing electric home appliances since 1910. In the early 1990s, the company had some 
problems due to poor performance and to a lost lawsuit against a former CEO, who was fired in 
1992. Thus, when Albert J. Dunlap became Sunbeam’s CEO in July of 1996, it was in the hope 
that this appointment would represent a turnaround for the company; Sunbeam’s stock soared by 
nearly 50 per cent the day Dunlap was hired to run the company in 1996, and its reported profits 
soared in 1997. At that point, Dunlap orchestrated a fraudulent scheme to create the illusion of a 
successful restructuring of Sunbeam to facilitate the sale of the company at an inflated price. The 
milestones of Sunbeam’s path to failure are tabulated below (Table 1). 
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Table 1. Sunbeam Corporation’s failure path: a chronological table of main events. 
Date Event 
July 1996 Albert Dunlap becomes Sunbeam’s CEO. 
Aggressive downsizing and cost-cutting strategies are implemented. 
October 1996 The accounting fraud begins. 
Improper recording of bill-and-hold sales, use of ‘cookie jar’ reserves to inflate 
1997 accounting results, ‘channel stuffing’ by shipping unsold inventory to 
retailers. 
September 1997 The attempt to sell the company fails. 
Stock attains premium levels. 
March and April 1998 Three companies (Coleman, First Alert and Signature Brands) are acquired by 
Sunbeam Corporation. 
Debt load following the acquisitions is covered with a loan from a bank 
consortium. 
June 1998 Laing’s article is published, the accounting fraud emerges and Dunlap is forced to 
resign. 
Jerry Levin becomes Sunbeam’s CEO. 
Reorganization focuses on fostering accountability at business-unit level, improving 
product quality and consumer services. 
February 2001 The decline of sales due to the slowdown of the US economy in 2000 makes it 
impossible to refinance corporate debt. 
Sunbeam files for Chapter 11 protection. 
It will emerge from Chapter 11 in December 2002 as American Household 
Corporation. 
 
The first point concerns the mechanisms of governance internal to the Sunbeam Corporation. 
The new CEO in 1996 enjoyed full powers; four of the five board members were chosen by 
Dunlap himself (the fifth was a main shareholder, Michael Price). In the following year, half of 
Sunbeam’s 12,000 jobs were eliminated, approximately 90 per cent of the products were 
discontinued and 18 of the 26 plants were closed (The New York Times, 1997). In fact, the new 
CEO, also known as ‘Rambo in Pinstripes’ for his aggressive downsizing and cost-cutting 
attitude (Dunlap, 1996), implemented the same strategies he had already successfully applied 
when he headed other companies, such as Scott Paper Company. He ordered massive cuts to 
product lines, plants and employees (Lublin and Brannigan, 1996). The implementation of these 
same actions excited analysts’ expectations for higher profits, pushing the stock to over US$45 
per share in September 1997.  
At this point, Dunlap thought he was ready to sell Sunbeam (as he did with Scott Paper 
Company), but the sale could not be concluded, despite numerous attempts by Sunbeam’s 
investment bankers. This strategy (SEC, 2001a, 2001b) misfired because Dunlap’s celebrity 
pushed Sunbeam stock to premium levels, making it too expensive for most acquirers and 
making the sale of the company itself impossible (Hill, 1999; Laing, 1998). 
As highlighted by Byrne (1999b), after the failure to find a buyer, Dunlap decided to use 
Sunbeam’s inflated stock to leverage money and to acquire other companies. In March 1998, 
Sunbeam acquired control of Coleman Inc., in part by means of an exchange of shares (Kadlec, 
1998). In April 1998, Sunbeam also bought, for cash, First Alert, Inc. and Signature Brands, Inc. 
In doing so, Sunbeam assumed a very large amount (around US$700 million) of previous debts 
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of the acquired companies (Canedy, 1998b). In order to cope with these debts, Sunbeam was 
granted a US$1.7 billion loan from a bank consortium (Brennan, 2001). 
The second point in Table 1 regards the accounting fraud. In April 1998, after the acquisition 
of the three companies mentioned above, there was a first warning of a slowdown in quarterly 
sales (Figure 2), and ‘Sunbeam began to publicly unravel’ (Byrne, 1999a). A wholly different 
story came to light: ‘At least $62 million of Sunbeam’s reported income of $189 million came 
from accounting fraud’ (SEC, 2001a: clause III). Among the many different fraudulent 
accounting techniques used by Sunbeam from October 1996 to June 1998, the SEC focused on 
‘the improper recording of bill-and-hold sales’. Moreover, Dunlap’s claimed that reorganization 
was based on several other improper practices, such as using ‘cookie jar’ reserves to inflate the 
accounting results of 1997 and ‘channel stuffing’ (shipping inventory before delivery or final 
acceptance) to reduce the value of inventory and to record large immediate profits. 
Sunbeam was increasingly in difficulty due to its efforts to keep up with market expectations and 
with the expectations of the CEO himself (Byrne, 1999b). Dunlap was, indeed, setting unattainable 
goals, such as doubling sales in 3 years and increasing operating margins from 2.5 to 20 per cent. 
Employees’ testimonies and complaints, collected by Byrne (1999b), reveal that Dunlap urged his 
subordinates to do whatever they could to reach almost impossible targets on pain of dismissal, but 
that he was also offering them much larger rewards in stock options than any other company if they 
met their goals. According to Sunbeam’s employees, ‘almost all executives believed these goals were 
impractical’, but they did not refuse their wage incentives (Byrne, 1999a). 
The fifth historical milestone (listed in Table 1) pertains to the fraud disclosure. By June 1998, 
when Sunbeam’s stock had fallen to around US$22 per share following the tumble in profits, an 
analyst from Barron’s Online (Laing, 1998) was the first to investigate, in detail, the reasons for 
such a sudden drop. Jonathan Laing’s article disclosed that Sunbeam had realized a negative 
operating cash flow in 1997 and insinuated that the company implemented questionable 
accounting practices (Norris, 2001a). Although several analysts still continued to believe in 
Sunbeam and its CEO, the company soon made a radical choice. The first decision (8 days after 
Barron’s discrediting article) resulted in Dunlap’s forced resignation, both because of this 
negative publicity and due to employees’ assertions about his working methods. By June 1998, 
the company’s directors had fired ‘Chainsaw Al’, commenting that they had ‘lost confidence’ in 
his leadership abilities (Mahabaj, 1998). Ronald Perelman, the former majority shareholder of the 
first company acquired by Sunbeam, was able to gain the confidence of the board and to name 
Jerry W. Levin as Dunlap’s successor in an attempt to salvage Sunbeam. Levin had been the CEO 
of Coleman from 1989 to 1991 and again from 1997 to March 1998 (when the company was sold 
to Sunbeam). After taking office at Sunbeam in June 1998, Levin announced that a restatement of 
the 1997 results was forthcoming in order to recover from ‘Chainsaw Al’ and that the company 
had no intention of going bankrupt (Connor, 1998). On 20 October 1998, Sunbeam announced 
the restatement of the results from the last quarter of 1996 through to the first quarter of 1998. 
Sunbeam’s 1997 net income was decreased by US$71 million, and 1997 operating expenses were 
mostly attributed to the previous year (US General Accounting Office, 2002: 201). Dunlap 
argued that this restatement concerned ‘technical accounting issues’ (Canedy, 1998b; Stanwick 
and Stanwick, 2003), which had been, or should have been, revised and approved by Sunbeam’s 
external auditors.  
The announcement raised some questions about the position of external auditors. In most 
fraud cases, auditors declare that they had no knowledge of the improper accounting practices 
used by the company. The Sunbeam case is unique because Phillip E. Harlow, the Arthur  
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Figure 2. Sunbeam’s stock chart. The chart shows that public investors, ranging from individuals to 
investment funds, who bought and held Sunbeam’s stock in anticipation of a true turnaround, lost billions 
as a result of the scheme. 
Source: SEC (2001b: clause 8). 
 
Andersen partner in charge of the Sunbeam audit, had discovered some of the fraudulent 
transactions and asked the company to change its financial statements. In particular, Harlow 
focused on a specific fraudulent method of creating fake profits, the so-called ‘spare-parts 
gambit’ (Norris, 2001b). Sunbeam stored many spare parts ‘in the warehouse of a company 
called EPI Printers, which sent the parts out as needed’ (Norris, 2001b). According to Sunbeam’s 
1997 financial statements, these parts were sold for US$11 million to EPI, with US$8 million of 
profit, while EPI was actually ready to pay only US$2 million. This was possible because of an 
‘agreement to agree’ signed by EPI with an escape clause. The deal was never closed, but the 
profit was booked. External auditors claimed to have effectively discovered this misstatement 
and concluded that it should have been modified, but Dunlap refused to make most of the 
requested changes. As a result of the negotiation between the auditors and the CEO, Sunbeam 
agreed to cut the profit by just US$3 million. After that, before deciding to sign, Harlow analysed 
Sunbeam’s financial statements thoroughly and understood ‘that the remaining profit was not 
material’; this was the same as saying that ‘the part of profit that was not presented fairly did not 
matter’ (Norris, 2001b). After the disclosure of the Sunbeam fraud, Harlow was supported by his 
firm (Arthur Andersen), which held that the case did not involve fraud but concerned 
‘professional disagreements about the application of sophisticated accounting standards’ (Norris, 
2001b). These disagreements actually made reference to an old ‘rule of thumb’ that the 
immateriality of misstatements was acceptable when their amount was below a predefined 
threshold level (5%–10%) of disclosure (Jennings et al., 1985). Sunbeam’s external auditor 
applied such a rule and considered materiality as a percentage of total income: 
In the typical accounting fraud case, the auditors say they were fooled. Here, at least according to the 
SEC, the auditors discovered a substantial part of what the commission calls ‘sham profits’. (Norris, 
2001b) 
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In fact, after Dunlap was fired, Arthur Andersen, along with another accounting firm, re-
audited the books and concluded that not only should the 1997 profits have been far lower but 
also that Sunbeam’s external auditors acted in a different way from the typical auditor in a typical 
accounting fraud. Indeed, after the bankruptcy of Sunbeam in 2001, following a class action 
lawsuit by shareholders and bondholders, Arthur Andersen was accused (only) of failing to 
exercise appropriate scepticism while conducting Sunbeam’s audits. The auditors paid up, but 
without admitting fault or liability. Dunlap was banned from ever serving as an officer or director 
of a public company because of his actions as Sunbeam’s CEO.2 
The sixth (and last) historical milestone (listed in Table 1) was formal bankruptcy. Sunbeam 
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on 6 February 2001, so marking the end of the very 
long 840-day path from Sunbeam’s fraud disclosure to bankruptcy. During the 2.5 years before 
this final event in its failing path, the company struggled to recover under the direction of Levin 
and of the new senior management team he appointed. This included some of the executives who 
had previously worked with him at Coleman, together with former Sunbeam managers and newly 
recruited experts in marketing and brand building. 
In August 1998, Levin announced a new strategy, aiming at ‘decentralizing operations’, 
improving ‘accountability at the business unit level’ and ‘increasing quality in products and 
consumer service’ (Sunbeam Corporation, 1998). The company was reorganized into three 
operating groups (Outdoor Leisure, Household Products and International), plus a Corporate 
Group providing support services. As part of the reorganization, the company discontinued 
Dunlap’s decision to close eight plants, keeping four of them open ‘to ensure a high level of 
quality and customer service, as well as a consistency of supply’. In clear opposition to the 
‘Chainsaw Al’ approach, Levin declared, ‘we won’t destabilize our brands, product quality and 
customer relationships by cutting too fast and too far’ (Sunbeam Corporation, 1998). 
The most relevant difficulties the company faced at the time were considered consequences of 
previous management choices. The fraudulent ‘channel stuffing’ practices had resulted in a huge 
increase of the inventory of some specific products. The need to sell off this inventory was 
expected to heavily affect the company’s results. For this reason, the already announced dividend 
was cancelled in August 1998. Sunbeam was also burdened with a US$2.2 billion debt, largely 
resulting from the recent acquisitions (Brannigan, 2002): Levin was able to negotiate a waiver on 
loan covenants pushing the deadline for reimbursement forward to April 1999 and, subsequently, 
to April 2000 (Ferrell et al., 2009; Sunbeam Corporation, 2000: 10). 
The confidence of the Board of Directors in the strategy devised by the new CEO was 
confirmed at the end of March 1999: Levin was appointed as Chairman (Sunbeam Corporation, 
1999). At that point, the stock was recovering slightly (Atlas and Tanner, 2001), but its value 
started to deteriorate again in the following year because results were not improving as expected. 
In January 2000, a new restructuring plan was announced, combining appliances and personal 
care items into a broader household products business unit, which would also manage healthcare 
products. Analysts declared that the move made sense, but was not addressing the crucial issue of 
refinancing the company’s still enormous debt (Friedlin, 2000). The further extension allowed to 
the company in April 2000 was conditional on a minimum cumulative earnings before interest, 
tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to be tested at the end of each month (Sunbeam 
Corporation, 2000: 10).  
After a growth of 3 per cent in the first quarter, in the second and third quarter of 2000 sales 
decreased by almost 10 per cent, mostly due to general economic weakness and a consequent 
slowdown in consumer spending. Sunbeam consequently failed the EBITDA test in the third 
quarter of 2000, and Levin reached a new agreement with creditors in November. In case of 
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failure to attain the adjusted monthly minimum EBITDA in the first quarter of 2001, there was 
‘no assurance that the Company could obtain a waiver or amendment’ (Sunbeam Corporation, 
2000: 11). The stock price of Sunbeam started deteriorating in the Fall of 2000, and the company 
ran short of cash. In January 2001, the New York Stock Exchange delisted the company’s stock 
for not complying with minimum listing criteria. The announcement of the decision to file for 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection followed shortly after, in February 2001, as Sunbeam did not 
meet the minimum EBITDA in January, and it proved impossible to obtain a further waiver.3 
The Board, then the new CEO and his managerial team had tried to avoid bankruptcy with 
many instruments and plans, but, in the end, their best efforts failed: the burden of debt proved 
insurmountable in the changed economic situation of the early 2000s. Further emerging scandals 
and a consequent stricter enforcement of new accounting regulations were then added in to 
undermine business confidence. This explains why the time-lapse to bankruptcy after fraud 
disclosure, even if very long, was not infinite. After such a disclosure, the delay of bankruptcy 
was initially made possible by the scapegoating of the CEO, in a context complicated also by 
creative auditing practices. In the following section, we will analyse the connections between 
these different factors. 
Discussion: putting the case to work 
This section re-addresses the research question posed in the Introduction and focuses on the 
explanatory items we have identified The authors will use the results of the SEC investigation 
and other above-mentioned sources to build a complex yet clear model of what happened. This 
focuses on the interacting factors explaining the exceptional features of the Sunbeam case. Such 
items, which are usually discussed in the literature individually, have been analysed through their 
interactions (Parker, 2012). In this way, the microanalysis of the case provides useful insights 
into the contingent nature of causal mechanisms. This permits the authors to return to the various 
general lessons that can be extracted from the case. The authors highlight a combination of three 
anomalies (expected features that are missing, contradicting existing models) in the failure path 
of Sunbeam Corporation. First, the failed sale of the company emphasizes a usually ‘invisible’ 
point about the much-studied connection between M&A and fraud (Erickson et al., 2011). 
Second, after the fraud disclosure, the scapegoat is identified as the CEO, allowing a tentative 
restart of the company and the delay of its bankruptcy. Third, the opportunistic use of auditing 
regulatory flexibility (‘creative auditing’ practices) does not imply auditors’ involvement in the 
corporate fraud after its disclosure and before the final bankruptcy. In the following, each point is 
considered in detail. 
The first point, the failed sale of the company, is related to the over-manipulation of 
accounting. As shown before, the motive for overstating Sunbeam’s performances lay in the gap 
between the actual economic results of the company and the exaggerated financial expectations. 
Dunlap pushed his management to make systematic use of ‘boosting’ practices, which is 
accounting fraud. The pervasiveness of such behaviour inside the company is explained by the 
higher-than-usual number of stock options in all the managers’ pay. Both top and middle 
managers found stronger and stronger incentives to boost reported performances (Bar-Gill and 
Bebchuk, 2002; Erickson et al., 2006; Goldman and Slezak, 2006). Yet, the peculiar effects of 
Sunbeam’s performance overstatement are even more interesting than the general causes leading 
to such overstatement. The increase in the stock price was so high that it eventually prevented 
Dunlap from selling the company. This point raises a theoretical problem: What does it mean 
when the price of a company’s stock exceeds the threshold for selling the company itself? 
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Following the account of the events as reported above, this paradox may be interpreted as the 
result of an inverted premium for control. Buyers discounted the fact that the company, once 
acquired, would lose its best non-replicable ‘intangible asset’, the CEO himself. In any case, they 
did not believe those high performances were replicable. 
The motivations that have been assigned to the attempted sale of the company lead to an 
examination of the heuristic role the case can perform, highlighting the conditions that could 
have allowed Sunbeam’s fraud to go undetected. In fact, if the sale of the company had been 
realized, it would have represented the final step of the process of reorganization and fraud 
implemented by Dunlap. In the CEO’s intentions, according to a possible logical reconstruction, 
such sale, if carried out, would be covered by the ‘veil of acquisition’ of all the problems that 
might have emerged from the inaccurate and inappropriate accounting practices preceding it. 
Recent studies show that companies accused of committing accounting fraud are more prone 
to buy other companies (Erickson et al., 2011). In fact, they use acquisition as a stratagem to 
conceal the fraud itself or at least to delay its disclosure. The analysis of the present case prompts 
the hypothesis that companies committing fraud might view the acquisition of other companies 
only as a second-best strategy. As the sale of the company became impossible, Dunlap resorted 
to the second-best strategy of acquiring other companies as an alternative tool for concealing 
accounting fraud and using overvalued company stocks as a financial lever to obtain the money 
to invest in the acquisitions. He would have preferred Sunbeam’s sale, as selling seems to 
provide a more successful cover-up of previous fraudulent accounting than acquisition. Thus, the 
historical financial statements of acquired companies may be a rich source for the investigation 
of possible undisclosed frauds. Sunbeam’s stated performances began showing some difficulties 
only 2 months after the triple acquisition because of the impossibility of taking the boosting 
practices (described above) too far. The results were a loss on the 1998 first quarter report and a 
consequent decline in the stock price. This attracted the attention of Laing (1998), whose analysis 
for Barron’s Online alarmed the board. Dunlap was fired after a rapid inspection of the second-
quarter results. This sequence of events confirms that analysts are effective whistle-blowers of 
frauds (Dyck et al., 2006), yet their actions are usually triggered by market signals. 
Dunlap’s forced resignation emphasizes the importance of the second listed item, that is, the 
‘scapegoating’ of the CEO. By blaming Dunlap alone for the fraud, Ronald Perelman tried to 
avoid bankruptcy putting Levin in charge of a tentative recovery. The new CEO was able to 
complete the company reorganization, which failed as the general economic conditions changed. 
The economic contraction of the first and third quarter of 2001 jeopardized demand and 
prevented the company from returning to profitability, causing it to collapse under the debt 
burden accumulated with the acquisitions. Perelman’s strategy and Levin’s attempt represent the 
factual explanation of Sunbeam’s exceptionally long trajectory to bankruptcy. Shareholders 
hoped to be reimbursed for their losses by supporting the idea that the only fraudulent actor was 
Dunlap. So, in the present case, Dunlap’s scapegoating represents the act of making a single 
person guilty for what was certainly a more complex process, even when the undeniable direct 
responsibilities of the ‘scapegoat’ are taken into account. 
The scapegoating of the CEO also implies that the auditors were not initially held 
responsible for the fraud, even though they were aware of misstated profits. In particular, by 
stating the immateriality of a part of improper profits after a negotiation with directors, they 
used their professional knowledge, their asymmetrical access to information and the flexibility 
inherent in auditing rules to distract other stakeholders’ attention from news that would reveal 
fraud. For these reasons, the authors can confirm the implementation of creative auditing in the 
Sunbeam case. 
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From this perspective, the case of Sunbeam may be a residual example of the blind alley down 
which auditing practices had been heading at the turn of the millennium. The later financial 
scandal surrounding the collapse of Enron would indeed lead to the demise of Arthur Andersen, 
which was both Sunbeam’s and Enron’s external auditor. Its involvement in Sunbeam’s case and 
other previous fraud cases caused prosecutors to consider it a recidivist offender. Thus, one may 
ascribe the particular behaviour of the auditor in the Sunbeam case to Andersen’s specific ‘firm 
culture’ (Carpenter et al., 1994). However, some studies suggest that Andersen’s way of working 
was not significantly different in quality from that of other auditing firms (Cahan, Zhang, and 
Veenman, 2011). For this reason, it may be supposed that it was more a matter of a ‘period 
culture’ (rather than of a specific ‘firm culture’) in the auditing profession. 
This hypothesis is supported by the introduction of new regulations after further comparable 
financial scandals following Sunbeam’s path to failure. Indeed, such events resulted in a ‘crisis of 
confidence’ in American capitalism, which led to wide-ranging debates, culminating in the 
Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002. The latter reformed and strengthened the regulation of accounting, 
auditing and corporate governance (Buckhoff et al., 2010; Raiborn and Schorg, 2004). So the 
implementation of creative auditing in the Sunbeam case represents a temporary condition that 
impinged on its failure path. This does not imply that creative auditing is no longer possible in 
any shape or form; certainly, new regulations, starting with the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, filled some 
holes in the legislation. Yet, the bounded nature of rationality implies an unavoidable residual 
incompleteness. Opportunistic agents did and surely will again exploit it in several ways. 
Conclusion: implications and findings 
This article investigates a single case, which emerged as an outlier (from a database of 
bankrupted American firms) because of the length of time from its fraud disclosure to its 
bankruptcy. This article closely examines this unique path to failure in a way that would be 
impossible with a larger dataset. The analysis shows that this case is the result of the interaction 
of normal and exceptional features; there is a series of complex connections between fraud, 
market performance, M&A choices, auditing and effects of fraud disclosure. 
The authors used a micro-historical method to infer some implications about general 
mechanisms regarding fraud and company failure. First, the authors focused on anomalies, 
shedding a critical light on existing explanatory models. The second focus centred on the 
heuristic function of an outlier, highlighting usually undetected features, and the third centred on 
its paradigmatic role as an exception, identifying other possible patterns (Ermakoff, 2014). 
Regarding the first point, in Sunbeam’s case, the CEO was scapegoated by shareholders, as 
well as by employees and auditors, with a view to avoiding immediate bankruptcy. With regard 
to the second point, the authors identify and describe an unacknowledged mechanism that allows 
fraud to go undisclosed. Buyers usually prefer not to denounce fraud if they discover it after 
acquisition. Such a mechanism is detectable here because of a particular contingency; the 
company’s stocks became too expensive to make a sale possible, so the company decided to 
acquire other entities. The owners of the newly merged company could not hide the fraud, so 
they minimized it, scapegoating the CEO and delaying bankruptcy. This explains the long time-
lapse between fraud disclosure and bankruptcy. This situation also led to an exoneration of the 
auditors. 
Regarding the third point, the authors finally observed that this peculiar combination of events 
was possible only before 2002; the Enron scandal represents a historical turning point for 
auditing regulation. 
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From these findings, one may draw two main general implications for further research. First, 
the authors identify a possible mechanism that allowed the fraud to go undisclosed after the 
successful sale of the company. It will be interesting to check the frequency of historical cases of 
undetected fraud on a dataset that collects data on sold companies. The detailed analysis of 
financial data can highlight undisclosed manipulations and integrate probable estimations about 
such cases (Wang, 2013). Second, as far as the authors are aware, this is the first comprehensive 
attempt to define the concept of ‘creative auditing’. Creative auditors exploit their professional 
knowledge, asymmetrical information and the flexibility of auditing rules to negotiate and 
collude with directors. As opportunistic agents, directors do this to distract the attention of 
principals (stakeholders) away from unwelcome news; this results in the principals’ inability to 
exercise control over the desired action of the agents. Indeed, auditors have access to essential 
information about the business organizations they audit. In this case, they used it in a then legal, 
if unethical, way to maximize their own interests at the expense of the stakeholders. Even if the 
opportunistic practices they used are no longer legal, new ones may emerge, both now and in the 
future. This supports recent claims for the triangulation of audit evidence to detect financial fraud 
(Trotman and Wright, 2012). Moreover, creative auditors may have used different mechanisms in 
the past; this invites further enquiries on how auditors could exploit the flexibility of standards in 
different historical contexts. 
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Notes 
1. John A. Byrne’s (1999b) book Chainsaw: The Notorious Career of Al Dunlap in the era of Profit-at-
Any-Price has been an invaluable source of information. It is a well-documented narrative, enriched 
with many interviews, which focuses on Al Dunlap’s career and character. It emphasizes Dunlap’s 
greed and strong personality in downsizing corporations for short-term shareholder profit. The aim of 
the book seems to be the provision of a specific lesson: bad leadership can destroy shareholder value 
and people’s lives. Its purpose is therefore different from the present work, which is not simply 
descriptive, and does not tell the full story of Dunlap’s career. This article is, in fact, more focused on 
theoretical and methodological issues. It implements a hybrid methodology, involving a blending of 
historical and empirical research methodologies, closely examining Sunbeam Corporation’s path to 
failure after selecting it as an outlier from a large sample, according to an original and empirically 
based procedure. Sunbeam Corporation’s path is analysed here in order to investigate the reasons for 
its singularity (i.e. exceptionally long time from the fraud disclosure to the final bankruptcy) and to 
highlight the limiting parameters of accounting models in use (and possible unobserved mechanisms). 
This leads the authors to propose a new theoretical definition of creative auditing as a key to 
interpreting recent historical changes in the relationship between fraud and bankruptcy in the United 
States. 
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2. He also paid US$15 million to settle a class action suit filed by investors in January 2002 and 
US$500,000 to settle US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) charges in September 2002 
(Brannigan, 2002; Norris, 2002). 
3. Sunbeam rapidly emerged from Chapter 11 in December 2002 and changed its name to American 
Household Corporation. Levin remained as a CEO until the new company was sold to Jarden 
Corporation in September 2004. 
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